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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN RE:
GEORGE

H. BADGER,

Disciplinary Proceeding

Case No.
12,052

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Disciplinary proceeding before the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar.
DISPOSITION BY BAR COMMISSIONERS
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar
adopted the Findings and Conclusions of the Disciplinary
Committee and recommended disbarment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
George H. Badger seeks dismissal of charges and vindication, or that failing, seeks suspension for a limited
period rather than disbarment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
George H. Badger was admitted to the Bar on November 7, 1960, and commenced practicing law about May,
1961. He is 40 years of age, married, and is the father of
five children.
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He engaged in the practice of law through the latter
part of 1966, when Robert Lord moved into the same
offices. Badger completed the transition of his law
practice to Lord about March, 1967, (R. 660) and since
that time Badger has been engaged in various commercial enterprises, and not in the practice of law. (R. 118,
119, 659, 660, 661, 663, 667, 668, 718, 586, 595, 598, 599,
602, 648, 631).

I

Two independent matters are involved in this proceeding, the first having occurred in connection with
the purchase of his residence at about the time that he
commenced his practice of law, and while he was green
and inexperienced in the practice of law (R. 591, 692).
The second matter occurred about six months after
Badger ceased to practice law (R. 659) and involved a
brief association with a computerized check collection
agency known as Federal Check Clearing House. Both
matters involved Badger's activities in commercial enterprises and neither matter involved his relationship
with clients in the practice of law. (R. 728.)
A civil fraud judgment was entered against Badger
in February, 1964, in an action by Howells pertaining to
the purchase in 1961 of his residence (Ex. 25, P. 51). The
Court found that he had misrepresented the validity and
value of certain promissory notes and mortgages assigned
to Howells to secure payment of a previously unsecured
balance due on the purchase price of the residence. (Ex.
25, P. 46-52). Badger denies that he in fact misrepresented said notes to Howells, alleges that the notes were
given to secure a pre-existing unsecured obligation (R.
560, 561, 566, 684), and that Howells parted with
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nothing in exchange for the notes (R. 560, 561, 566, 694,
702) and were no worse off if the notes were valueless
than they were before the notes were received (R. 570,
572, 574), that Howells were in fact not defrauded. A delay of approximately 8 years occurred between the al- 1
leged misconduct and the commencement of the hearing
in this matter (R. 726, 727), although oral complaint was
made by Howells to the Secretary of the Bar shortly
after the alleged misconduct (R. 726, 727), and Howell
wrote a formal letter of complaint to the Bar approximately three years before the complaint was filed and
about four years before the hearing before the bar commenced.
The Federal Check Clearing House matter occurred
about six months after Badger ceased practicing law (R.
659, 660). He was employed as sales manager for a
snowmobile distributor calling on merchants when he
interested his employer in entering into a computerized
check collection agency as joint-venture with another organization which was then engaged in collection of dishonored checks for merchants (R. 658). Badger had an
option to purchase stock of his employer but never exercised that option (R. 719). He was not an officer,!
director or stockholder of his employer corporation (R. I
658).
The joint-venture operated under the name of Federal
Check Clearing House (herein referred to as FCCH),
with an accountant handling the computer programming,
print out of demand letters, accounting information
and preparation of a summons. From the beginning
of the operations independent counsel was employed by
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FCCH to represent them in their legal matters (R. 627,
663). Initially that attorney was Robert Lord, the attorney to whom Badger had transferred his legal practice. Badger was not a partner with Lord and did not
share in any fees earned by Lord from FCCH (R. 663,
630). Lord reveiwed the collection letter used by FCCH
and furnished legal advice to FCCH on an hourly fee
basis (R. 639, 617). FCCH assessed collection charges
and punitive damages against check writers which they
retained as their revenue and remitted the full amount of
the check to merchants. Initially the demand letters
were erroniously programmed to show Lord's initials,
but with Badger's signature block (R. 631, 632), and a
signature stamp that Badger had available for a commercial enterprise was used by FCCH without his knowledge or consent to sign Badger's name to the computer
printed letters (R. 664, 610). When Badger and Lord
learned of this error it was corrected to show Lord's
r' name as the writer of the letter (R. 600, 664). Demand letters previously used by the other joint-ven. turer were used with a few minor changes suggested
by Lord (R. 634). Those letters improperly advised the
: check writer that he was liable for attorney fees and
included a reference to the criminal code concerning isl suance of checks against insufficient funds. (Ex. 13, 14).
Badger solicited business for FCCH from approximately
two or three business, (R. 666) some of whom claim that
Badger represented that he would act as attorney for
FCCH in collecting checks. Badger denies that he made
any such representations and denies that he at any time
intended to act as attorney for FCCH in collecting
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checks. (R. 631, 118, 119, 659, 660, 661, 663, 667, 668, 718,
586, 595, 598, 599, 602, 603, 648). The merchants who
claim that Badger represented that he would act as attorney for FCCH did not employ FCCH services. (R.
216, 221).
More detailed statements of fact are included with the
argument under specific points.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
HOWELLS WERE NOT DEFRAUDED
(a) Howells parted with nothing of value.
About Sept. 8, 1961, Howells exchanged a residence to
Badgers for a $20,000.00, 1/2 interest in a real estate contract concerning some West Yellowstone property and
assumption by Badger's nominee of an existing mortgage
on the residence. (Exhibit 32) Title to the Yellowstone
property failed as the result of a default by a third party
and Howells then had a $20,000.00 unsecured claim
against Badgers. (R. 560, 561, 562, 570, 571, 572) Badger then obtained two promissory notes (Exhibit 34, 35)
totaling $55,000.00 which were assigned to Rowels about
January, 1962, well after Howells had deeded the residence and surrendered possession of the residence to
Badgers. (R. 565, 695, 696). Said notes were assigned as
security for the $20,000.00 indebtedness. (R. 566). The
claimed fraud is an alleged misrepresentation by Badger
to Howells concerning the validity of the $55,000.00
notes assigned to Howells as security for the $20,000.00
unsecured Badger obligation. From the time that the
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West Y elllowstone transaction failed, Howells had an unsecured claim against Badgers (R. 570, 571, 572).
Howells were in no worse position after receiving allegedly worthless notes from Badger than they were
before those notes were received since they still had
th same unsecured claim against Badgers. (R. 570, 571,
572). Howells parted with both title and possession of
the residence in reliance upon promises by Badgers to
perform future acts of providing security and paying the
obligation. (R. 560, 561, 562). Failure to perform a future promise cannot constitute fraud.
Probably the reason that the fraud was included in
the findings was to prevent the possible discharge of the
judgment in bankruptcy. Had the fraud question been
an important consideration in deciding the case certainly Judge Hansen would have included fraud in his
memorandum decision. (Exh 25, p 43-44).
(b) The Court struck all findings of fraud.

The memorandum decision made by the Court did not
include findings of fraud but only findings that Badgers
were indebted to Howells for the unpaid purchase price
and for attorney fees. (Ex. 25, P. 43-44). The judgment
is inconsistent in that it includes an award for attorney
fees under the terms of the earnest money receipt (Ex.
32), yet purports to be based upon fraud which would be
a tort claim upon which no attorney fees could be
awarded.
Howells expressly consented to the Court reviewing the
trial record in their affidavits and to the striking of all
reference to fraud in the findings, conclusions and judg-
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ment in the event that the Court found that the Defendants were not in fact guilty of fraud. (Ex. 48, pages
4-7) Judge Hansen in fact made the following order
after a review of the Court record and the Howell affidavits:
" ... ORDERED, that all reference in the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment entered
in the above entitled matter to fraud by the Defendants George Badger and LaJuana I. Badger be
and the same hereby are struck and deleted therefrom, and that no fraud exists or is found in this
matter, it appearing to the Court that prior to the
delivery of said notes to Howells by Badger the
Badgers owed an unsecured indebtedness to Howells
and thaat Howells did not part with anything of
value or change their position in reliance upon or
in exchange for said notes, and that when said notes
proved to be valueless that Howells were still the
holders of an unsecured claim against Badgers."
The Court had authority to correct its Findings and
Judgment, Rule 60(b), URCP; Granite School Dist. v.
Cox, 16 U. (2d) 20,395 P.2d 55; CJS Judgments, Sec. 230,
232, particularly in view of the stipulation by Howells
authorizing such correction. (Ex. 48, Pages 4-7). It was
unnecessary to give notice of the motion to correct the
Findings and Judgment to or to obtain the permission of
Howell's prior counsel because their services had long
since been terminated and they were no longer representing Howells. (R. 801).
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The Bar Committee was advised that Badger intended
to ask Judge Hansen to review the record and to strike
the findings of fraud and the Prosecuting Committee of the Bar was invited to appear before Judge
Hansen and to participate in argument of the motion to
correct the findings and judgment. (R. 801). Judge
Hansen tried the case and was in the best position of
anyone to rule on the fraud question and to determine
whether or not Badger had committed fraud and whether
the fraud findings should or should not be struck. The
logical place to litigate the fraud question was before
Judge Hansen. The prosecuting Committee elected not
to participate in those proceedings and should not now t·
be permitted to question Judge Hansen's order striking ,
the fraud findings. The Court record of the Howell case '
as amended by Judge Hansen's order establishes a prima
facia case of Badgers innocence.

I

( c) Badger did not misrepresent the validity of the
Bigler notes. (R. 712).

Badger produced a contract giving an option (Exhibit
47) to his nominee, Stanley H. Mellor, to purchase for
$80,000.00 the Idaho property pledged as security for
the promissory notes, which option was granted in recognition of the security interest represented by the promissory notes (Exhibits 34 & 35) assigned to Howells as
security for the $20,000.00 Badger obligation. Had Howells accepted, retained and enforced those notes they
would have had to pay prior obligations of $180,000.00 secured by that property which is $100,000 more than the
option price. (Exhibits 34 & 35). Bigler stipulated that
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he was in fact indebted to Badger and agreed to pay
Howells (Ex. 25, Page 35-36) but did not pay. Badger
participated in the foreclosure action in the Idaho Courts
where the validity of the interest mentioned in those
promissory notes was recognized. (R. 702). It should
be noted that the promissory notes (Ex. 34 & 35) show
that they were recorded in the office of the County Recorder. Howells were offered an opportunity to acquire
the Idaho property under the terms of the option agreement. (R. 703).
POINT II
UNCONSCIONABLE DELAY FROM ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT BY HOWELL TO BAR REQUIRES
DISMISSAL OF HOWELL CHARGES
(a) Badger was deprived of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.

Howell and his wife discussed their complaints concerning Badger with Dean Sheffield, Secretary of the
Utah State Bar Association, early in 1961 or 1962. (R.
727). Howell wrote a letter of complaint to the Bar,
July 22, 1965 (Ex. #1) wherein he asked the Bar to investigate Badger, indicated that he would be at the "disposal" of the Bar should they wish to contact him, and
stated that the facts were set forth in case #134741 in
the District Court of Salt Lake County. The complaint
was not filed by the Bar until September, 1968, approximately 7 years after the Howell transaction (Ex. 32)
and the first complaint to the Executive Secretary of
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the Bar, and over 3 years after Howell's letter to the
Bar (Ex. 1). The facts in the case were approximately
8 years old at the time of the hearing. Memories were
dim, witnesses were no longer available, and this long delay made it impossible for Badger to defend the case on
the merits by presenting witnesses other than himself.
His records were incomplete and not readily available.
Badger had long since abandoned his appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment in the Howell case and
paid that judgment. Had the Bar acted when the first
complaint was made by Howell, remedies then available
in that proceeding by way of appeal or otherwise could
have been utilized to protect Badger's interests. It is
manifestly unfair to call upon him to defend himself
against charges concerning transactions more than 8
years old, particularly where no just cause for the delay
exists.
Lawyers are first class citizens and as such are entitled to the same Fourteenth Amendment rights in disciplinary proceedings as any other person. Spevack V.
Klein (1967) 385 U.S. 511, 87 S. Ct. 625. State v.
Mathis (1957) 7 U. 2d 100, 103; 319 P.2d 134, 136. In the
Spevak case the Court held that assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination by a lawyer who refused to
produce records did not justify disbarment. The right
to practice law is a property right and no attorney can
lawfullly be deprived of such right except by due process
of law. In re Ruffalo (1968) 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222;
In re Schlesinger ( 1961) 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835. In
Klopfer v. State of North Carolina (1967) 386 U.S. 213,
87 S. Ct. 988, the Court held that the right to a speedy
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trial is guaranteed to defendants in state courts pursuant
to the Sixth Amendment which is held to be included
within the Fourteenth Amendment protections. Badger
was entitled to a speedy trial of the Howell complaint.
Surely a delay of 6 or 7 years from the time of the first
oral complaint to the Bar by Howell, of over 3 years from
the first written complaint by Howell to the Bar, and of
approximately 4 years from the time of that written complaint until the Bar hearing is a denial of Badger's right
to a speedy trial. Prejudice is presumed when a person
is denied such a fundamental constitutional right as the
right to a speedy trial. 5 Wharton's Criminal procedure
514 and cases there cited.
The entire responsibility for providing a speedy trial
to an accused lawyer rests on the shoulders of the Bar
Commission, and this duty cannot be delegated. 21 Am.
J ur. 2d 279. Badger had no duty with respect to it.
There can be no question that Badger was greatly prejudiced by this unconscionable delay.
The time in which an accused is to be secured in his
right to a speedy trial must be computed from the time
when the prosecution has available to it evidence of the
alleged offense sufficient to put them on a duty of making further inquiry. People v. Hrycink, 36 Ill. 2d 500; 224
NE 2d 250.
(b) Stale disciplinary proceedings are regarded with
disfavor.

In his explanation of the majority opinion in the Bridwell matter Justice Ellett stated:
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"
disciplinary proceedings initiated a long time
after the alleged commission of the act complained
of should be regarded with disfavor and due allowances made for the lack of opportunity on the part of
the accused attorney to present a proper defense
under the circumstances." In re Bridwell, Utah Su,
preme Court Case #11546,
U.2d
, 474
P.2nd 116.
The doctrine of laches is applicable to disciplinary
proceedings. 7 Am. Jr. 2d. 86; In re Steffensen (1938) 94
U. 436, 78 P.2d 531. State v. Haggerty (1942) 241 6
N.W.2d 203. Thornton on Attorneys, Sec. 880. Columbus
Bar Assn. v. Teaford, (1966) 117 N.E.2d 872. Murrell v.
Florida Bar (1960), 122 So. 2d 169; In re Ratner (1965),
399 P .2d 865; Florida Bar v. King ( 1965) , 17 4 So. 2d 398.
( c) This proceeding is barred by Statute of Limitations

In the Bridwell case Supra, Judge Ellett indicated that:
" ... absent a statute or rule on the matter, we do
not think the statute of limitations applies to a disciplinary proceeding against a member of the bar ... "
It is respectfully suggested that the Court re-examine
the applicability of existing statutes of limitations to a
disciplinary proceeding. 76-1-11 ( 4), UCA, 1953, defines a crime or public offense as including the commission or omission of an act forbidden or commanded by
law, and which is punishable by removal from office.
An attorney is an officer of the Court and holds an office
within the meaning of that statute. 76-1-13, UCA, 1953,
classifies as misdemeanors all crimes or public offenses
which are not felonies, and 77-9-6, UCA, 1953, fixes a
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two year statute of limitations on misdemeanors. The
two year statute of limitations on prosecution of misdemeanors; and, even the four year limitation on prosecution of felonies provided by 77-9-2, UCA, 1953, expired
before the commencement of this proceeding and constitute a bar to the Howell matter.
77-51-1, UCA, 1953, provides in part as follows:
"The court, unless good cause to the contrary is
shown, must order the prosecution to be dismissed
in the following cases:
( 1) When a person has been held to answer for a
public offense, if an information is not filed or an
indictment found against him at the next term of
the court at which he is held to answer.
(2) If the defendant, whose trial has been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial
at the next term of the court in which the information or indictment is triable after is filed or found.
In State v. Mathis, 7 U. (2d) 100, 319 P.2d 134, this
Court held that the time limitations provided by that
statute are maximum limitations unless good cause for
delay is shown. The Bar Association is an arm of the
judiciary and of the State of Utah and as such is bound
to protect the rights of the accused in the same manner
as a person charged with a public offense in the criminal
courts. Both periods limited by said statute expired
before commencement of the hearing in this matter.
Section 78-12-25, UCA, 1953, fixes a four year limitation on commencement of a action where no other period
of limitations is specifically provided; and 78-12-33, UCA,
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1953, provides that the Statute of Limitations is applicable
where the action is brought in the name of or "for the
benefit of the state," and 78-12-46, UCA, 1953, provides
that "action" includes special proceedings of a civil nature. The Utah Bar is an integrated bar and is an arm
of the State of Utah, under authority granted by 78-51-12,
UCA, 1953.
The policy reasons precluding stale actions in a civil
proceeding are equally applicable to disciplinary proceedings as to other cases.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT FINDING
THAT BADGER WAS ATTORNEY FOR
FEDERAL CHECK CLEARING HOUSE
(a) Solicitation:

Badger had discontinued his law practice over six
months before he participated in Federal Check Clearing House, hereafter referred to as FCCH. (R. 659, 660).
He was not then interested in doing any legal work for
for FCCH and in fact FCCH was represented by Lord
and other attorneys from the time that they commenced
business (R. 631, 118, 119, 659, 660, 661, 663, 667, 668, 718,
586, 595, 598, 599, 602, 603, 648). Letters from Lord's
office which still contained Badger's name on the letterhead (in connection with the transfer of Badger's law
practice to Lord) (R. 660) were sent to persons who had
issued dishonored checks. For a period of time those
letters did erroniously contain the name and signature
stamp of Badger, however when Badger discovered this
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matter the compute was reprogrammed and his name
was removed from the letter (R. 600, 637, 664). Badger
was guilty of poor judgment and poor control of the
situation to permit this to occur and to thus create the
impression that he was attorney for FCCH, but in fact
he was not and never intended to act as their attorney
(R. 118, 119, 586, 595, 598, 599, 602, 603, 631, 659, 660, 661,
663, 667, 668, 718).
The only other evidence presented by the prosecution
tending to indicate that Badger was acting as or intended
to act as attorney for FCCH was the testimony of Doris
Smith and Robert V. Johnson concerning a conversation
between Badger and Johnson of Albertsons wherein they
claim that Badger stated that if checks were not paid that
he would take them to court since he was a lawyer. (R.
235). Melvin G. Jacobs was called as a witness by the
prosecution to testify concerning that conversation. however he stated that there was no conversation with respect to Badger operating as an attorney (R. 205).
Badger also denies that he represented in any manner
that he was an attorney or that he would be involved
in collecting checks for FCCH. (R. 631, 118, 119, 659,
660, 661, 663, 667, 668, 718, 586, 595, 598, 599, 602, 603,
648). In paragraph #2 of the Findings by the Committee (R. 47) it is claimed that in reliance upons such representatives Albertsons Inc. entered into an agreement
through Badger to have FCCH collect dishonored checks
for them. This finding is in error since the Albertsons
store where Johnson, Smith and Jacobs were employed
never used the service of FCCH. (R. 216, 221). The
Albertsons store where Dastrup was employed did use
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the service of FCCH, however Dastrup was not even
aware that Badger was an attorney (R. 194), and it
is unlikely that Badger even participated in solicitation
of that store since Dastrup was unsure about his identification of Badger (R. 197, 199) and Badger expressly
denied that he ever met Dastrup before the hearing
(R.719).
Badger did not use good judgment in participating in
solicitation of any business for FCCH because of the
false impression that such solicitation might create in
'1the minds of persons who knew that he was an attorney;
however, it is not illegal for a person who is not practicing
[law to engage in solicitation of business for a collection
agency. His activities somehow created an impression
in the minds of Johnson and Smith that he was soliciting
legal business for himself, and the letter that was sent
to check writers containing his name created that impression in the minds of others. Badger is guilty of
poor judgment and poor control of the activities of his
associates, but is not guilty of solicitation of legal business
for himself; and, use of poor judgment in a commercial
business does not warrant disbarment.
I

(b) Use of word "Federal" in FCCH name

Badger did not research the law concerning use of the
word "Federal" in the name of FCCH, however he did
discus it with four ( 4) attorneys, (R. 662) including an
assistant United States Attorney, (R. 649) and use of
"Federal" in the name was immediately discontinued
after about four to six ( 4 to 6) weeks use, when objection
was made by the office of the United States Attorney.
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(R. 662). Use of the word "Federal" in FCCH name was
poor judgment but does not warrant disbarment, particularly where these acts were done in a non-proessional
capacity as a businessman and not as an attorney. Re
Jones ( 1926) 68 U. 213, 249 P. 803.

( c) Contents of collection letters:

Statements contained in the collection letters to the
effect that the debtor was liable for attorney fees and
the indication therein that issuance of a dishonored
check was a criminal offense were improper. (Exhibit
14). The statement concerning punitive damages and
costs and the automatic issuance of a summons if the
check was not paid by a particular date appear to have
been accurate statements. (Exhibit 14).
Badger was not the author of the collection letter. Apparently substantially the same letter had been used
for some time by Collect-A-Check who operated FCCH
as a joint venture with "Ardco," and the letter was continued in substantially the same form with only minor
revisions after being reviewed by FCCH attorney. (R.
604, 636, 611). Badger used poor judgment in permitting that letter to be used by FCCH while he was affiliated in any manner with that organization, however his
contact with the program was limited (R. 602, 665) and
covered only a short period of time, after which he disassociated with FCCH. (R. 665). It is important to keep
in mind that Mr. Badger's activities were those of an
employee of a commercial enterprise and not that of an
attorney actively engaged in the practice of law. He
did not share in any legal fees paid by FCCH (R. 617, 630,
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663). An attorney will not be disbarred for misconduct
not in his professional capacity, unless such conduct is
infamous or very gross. In Re Jones, 68 U. 213, 249
P. 803, held that the change of name of the grantee in
a deed after it's execution did not warrant disbarment.
CONCLUSION
The transactions involved in this proceeding were in a
non-professional capacity, the first in connection with
the purchase of a residence from Howell who was never
a client of Badger, and the second in connection with a
computerized check collection agency known as Federal
Check Clearing House some six months after Badger
discontinued the practice of law. It is only when misconduct by an attorney in a non-proessional capacity is
"infamous or very gross" that he will be disbarred. Re
Jones (1926) 68 U. 213, 249 P. 803 (holding that a change
in the name of the grantee in a deed after its execution,·
in the name of the grantee in a deed after its execution
did not warrant disbarment). The Disbarment recommendation of the Bar Commission is too harsh punishment for the circumstances existing in this case. In Re
Bridwell, Utah Supreme Court Case #11546

U.2d

_ _ _ , 474 P.2d 116.
In view of the delay in the Howell matter of eight (8)
years from the occurance of the alleged misconduct to
the date of the hearing, of approximately seven (7) years
from the first oral complaint to the Bar and three (3)
years from the written complaint before the proceedings
were comenced and approximately four ( 4) years from
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the written complaint to the date of hearing, the Howell
matter should be dismissed as a stale claim, as barred
by the statute of limitations, by latches and because of
denial to Badger of his right to a speedy trial. The record does not "clearly establish" Badger's guilt in the
Howell matter, particularly where the Judge who made
the finding of fraud has now struck all fraud findings
from the record and has held that Howell was not in
fact defrauded.
Substantial disputes exist as to the extent of Badger's
responsibility for the content of the demand letters and
concerning representations made concerning his intent
to act as attorney for Federal Check Clearing House
(FCCH). No evidence was adduced which would indicate that Badger ever commenced or participated in a
lawsuit by FCCH or that he received any attorney fees
directly or indirectly from FCCH. FCCH employed an
independent lawyer from the beginning of its operations.
Badger did use poor judgment in being involved in any
manner with FCCH when it was sending improper demand letters, in not preventing the improper use of his
name and signature stamp on those letters, and in engaging in any manner in solicitation of business from
merchants who might be aware that he was an attorney
and who might thereby obtain the impression that he
was soliciting legal business for himself. Badger also
used poor judgment in failing to keep in close enough
contact with the business activities of FCCH to prevent
errors such as the use of his name on demand letters and
the use of improper methods in those demand letters.
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It should be kept in mind that in connection with these

activities Badger was acting as a businessman and not
as an attorney and accordingly he was not held to the
same high standard as an attorney engaged in the practice of law.
If George Badger is to be punished for his poor judg-

ment we feel that the punishment of disbarment recommended by the Bar Commission is too harsh. He has in
fact been voluntarily suspended from the practice of
law for over four years. His name should not be unnecessarily tarnished by disbarment under the circumstances.
Respectfully Submitted,
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